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DEPORTATION IN THE SHADOWS OF DUE
PROCESS: THE DANGEROUS
IMPLICATIONS OF DHS V. THURAISSIGIAM
Daniel Kanstroom*
The deportation of many thousands of "people who were previously
integral members of U.S. society" and who have long "been part of the social
fabric of the United States" is-as Beth Caldwell notes-a human rights
tragedy of immense proportions that should not be forgotten.' However, an
ever-expanding array of fast-track, unreviewable, discretionary immigration
enforcement mechanisms raise equally compelling-if distinct-concerns.
Even as we attend to how "deportation is particularly cruel for people who
grew up in the United States,"2 we must not acquiesce in the relegation of
recent entrants-or, indeed, recent re-entrants-to a rightless realm of
unreviewable arbitrary enforcement. This is especially true for those fleeing
from persecution and other severe harms and for unaccompanied minors.3
The Supreme Court's approval of such mechanisms in Department of
Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam4 may affect due process, habeas corpus,
and the necessity of judicial review of agency action dangerously and
corrosively.' Justice Alito, writing for a 5-4 majority, concluded that neither
* Professor of Law, Thomas F. Carney Distinguished Scholar, Faculty Director, Rappaport
Center for Law and Public Policy, and Co-Director, Center for Human Rights and International
Justice, Boston College.
1. BETH C. CALDWELL, DEPORTED AMERICANS: LIFE AFTER DEPORTATION TO MEXICO 1-
2 (2019).
2. Id. at 189.
3. See, e.g., Osorio-Martinez v. Att'y Gen., 893 F.3d 153, 176-78 (3d Cir. 2018) (discussing
how special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status reflects alien children's significant ties to this country
and Congress's determination that such aliens should be accorded important statutory and
procedural protections, SIJ designees are entitled to invoke the Suspension Clause and petition the
federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus).
4. 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
5. Along with a few other scholars included in the issue, the author signed an amicus brief in
support of the Respondent advancing a similar argument. See Brief of Amici Curiae Immigr.
Scholars in Support of Respondent 1-2 & app. at 2a-3a, Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,
140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020) (No. 19-161), 2020 WL 402610, at *1-2 & app. *2a-3a.
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the Suspension Clause 6 nor the Due Process Clause mandate habeas corpus
(or any other) judicial review of a summary government denial of an asylum
claim brought by a noncitizen on U.S. soil. As Justice Sotomayor poignantly
noted in her dissent, the Court held "that the Constitution's due process
protections do not extend to noncitizens . .. , who challenge the procedures
used to determine whether they may seek shelter in this country or whether
they may be cast to an unknown fate."7 This precludes any means to ensure
the "integrity" of an expedited removal order and "upends settled
constitutional law."" Moreover, it "paves the way toward transforming
already summary expedited removal proceedings into arbitrary
administrative adjudications." 9 As bleak as this is, Justice Sotomayor may
actually have understated the dangers of Thuraissigiam as its ramifications
for the future of habeas corpus are also worrisome. 0
To see why this is so, let us first review certain basics of U.S. exclusion
and deportation law, which are still largely governed by a relatively few-
and quite venerable-doctrinal decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. All
scholars and practitioners in the field can easily recite the cases and their
basic constitutional holdings quickly and colloquially. The so-called
"Chinese Exclusion Case"" located the government's power to exclude as
an "incident of sovereignty" and defined it as essentially immune from
meaningful constitutional scrutiny.12 Fong Yue Ting v. United States then
accepted this power internally, holding that the power to deport is "as
absolute and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent ... entrance into
6. The Suspension Clause provides that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
7. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1993 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Amanda L. Tyler, Thuraissigiam and the Future of the Suspension Clause,
LAWFARE (July 2, 2020, 12:31 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/thuraissigiam-and-future-
suspension-clause (citing to Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)) (explaining that
Thuraissigiam "calls into question several aspects of the Supreme Court's earlier decision
in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), and more generally signals a more limited vision of
the Suspension Clause than Boumediene embraced."). Also of great concern is Justice Kavanaugh's
cavalier and overbroad assertion in United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance
for Open Society International, Inc., 140 S Ct. 2082, 2086 (2020), that "foreign citizens outside
U. S. territory do not possess rights under the U. S. Constitution." Space constraints compel me to
defer discussion of this problem.
11. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 589 (1889). As
Louis Henkin once noted, its "very name is an embarrassment." The Constitution as Compact and
as Conscience: Individual RightsAbroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 29 (1985).
12. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609.
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[this] country."1 3 As to process, the Court in Ekiu v. United States held that
the fact-based decision of an inspector of immigration that "an alien
immigrant" shall not be permitted to land was "final and conclusive." 14
Such bright line constitutional rules were deeply unstable and had to be
qualified, at least within the United States. Three dissenters in Fong Yue Ting
had noted this, 5 including Stephen J. Field who had authored the opinion in
the Chinese Exclusion Case.16 A major problem was how to reconcile the
internal application of absolutist, anti-constitutional "plenary power"
doctrine with emerging norms of equal protection and due process
represented by cases, such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins.' One sees the
contradictions and the doctrinal tectonic fault lines in Yamataya v. Fisher,
where Justice Harlan intoned:
[T]his Court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding,
that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute
involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles
that inhere in 'due process of law' as understood at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution.18
One of the most important such "principles is that no person shall be
deprived of . .. liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before
such officers, in respect of the matters upon which that liberty depends."19
Simply put, some procedural due process norms apply to those facing
deportation. They are constitutionally protected against "such arbitrary
power." 20 However, in a caveat for the ages, Justice Harlan left the door open
as to "whether an alien can rightfully invoke the due process clause of the
Constitution who has entered the country clandestinely, and who has been
here for too brief a period to have become, in any real sense, a part of our
population, before his right to remain is disputed." 21
13. 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
14. 142 U.S. 651, 663 (1892).
15. See 149 U.S. at 733 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 745-46 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761-
62 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
16. 130 U.S. at 581.
17. See, e.g., 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
18. 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903).
19. Id. at 101.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 100. Contemporaneously with the Court's infamous "separate but equal" decision
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Court in Wong v. United States held on a more
substantive constitutional front that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments forbade the imprisonment at
hard labor without a jury trial for non-citizens convicted of illegal entry to or presence in the United
States. 163 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1896). This bright-line distinction between deportation and
punishment drawn by the Wong Court masked some quite complex problems beyond the scope of
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For more than a century, then, immigration law has continued to grapple
with these major constitutional dilemmas (among others):
1. Who is left unprotected by due process norms?
2. What do such norms require?
3. What is the constitutional required role of federal courts in
overseeing these norms?
The brevity of this essay precludes analysis of the multifarious situations
in which these questions have previously arisen, but we now face a massive
fast-track, often arbitrary and dangerous enforcement system that exists in
what Beth Caldwell evocatively calls the "shadow of due process." 22
The Supreme Court had a historic opportunity to shine some light into
this shadowy realm. However, the Court substantially missed the mark in
Thuraissigiam. Although the case does not directly apply to "deported
Americans," its oversights and undertones are extremely troubling for those
of us who have long been concerned about the increasing deformalization of
deportation proceedings and the concomitant deprecation of constitutional
and human rights norms for the noncitizens among us. 23
The issue in Thuraissigiam was essentially whether an asylum seeker
placed in "expedited removal" proceedings soon after entering the United
States could obtain judicial review of an allegedly arbitrary denial of his
claim.24 As noted above, U.S. courts have long held that noncitizens on U.S.
soil are entitled to due process protections. 25 However, the process due to a
this essay. See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts
About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890 (2000).
22. CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 17-47; see also Daniel Kanstroom, Expedited Removal and
Due Process: A "Testing Crucible of Basic Principle" in the Time of Trump, 75 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1323 (2018); [hereinafter Kanstroom, Expedited Removal and Due Process]; Vanessa M.
Garza, Comment, Unheard and Deported: The Unconstitutional Denial of Habeas Corpus in
Expedited Removal, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 881 (2019).
23. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN
DIASPORA (2012); see also Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering
Contributors to the Immigration A djudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 542, 579-82 (2011);
ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS THAT BYPASS THE COURTROOM 10-30 (2014);
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role ofDiscretion, 5 COLUM. J.
RACE & L. 1, 3 (2014); Kari Hong, The Costs of Trumped-Up Immigration Enforcement Measures,
2017 CARDOzO L. REV. DE NOVO 119, 124 (2017); Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of
Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 193 (2017).
24. 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1963-65 (2020).
25. Although Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Afezei held that "aliens who have once
passed through our gates, even illegally," possess certain constitutional rights, while "an alien on
the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing," presence at a port of entry on U.S. soil
does not constitute entry into the country. 345 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1953) ("[H]arborage at Ellis Island
is not an entry into the United States."). For due process purposes, a noncitizen at a port of entry
"is treated as if stopped at the border." Id. at 215; see also Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185,
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"clandestine entrant," apprehended on American soil, near the border, soon
after entry, has not been definitively resolved. 2 6
This constitutional uncertainty has facilitated various informal, fast-
track removal mechanisms for many years. 27 Such systems raise obvious
concerns for those fleeing persecution or severe harm. An influx of people
fleeing Cuba and Haiti in the 1980s led to legislative proposals for "summary
exclusion," which sought to "stymie unauthorized migration by restricting
the hearing, review, and appeal process for aliens arriving without proper
documents." 2 1 "Summary exclusion" was later instantiated as "expedited
removal of arriving aliens" in 1996.29 This new system was first applied only
at the border. But it is now also used against some "clandestine entrants."30
It allows government agents to remove people quickly and, in many cases,
completely outside of immigration courts and federal courts.31 It drastically
restricts process protections, imposes mandatory detention, and essentially
eliminates hearing, appeal, and judicial review processes for noncitizens
without proper documents. Those "expeditiously removed" are barred from
returning for five years. 32
Some habeas review of an expedited removal order is statutorily
permitted; but it is extremely limited.33 Essentially, the statute deems certain
noncitizens on U.S. soil to be "unadmitted" or, technically, "inadmissible." 34
The 1996 statutes, however, replaced the territorial conceptual dividing line
188 (1958) (noting entry fiction applies to a noncitizen who is "paroled" into the country pending
determination of admissibility).
26. Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 215-16.
27. See generally Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making
OF MODERN AMERICA (2004); see also Marc R. Rosenblum, Shifts in the US Immigration
Enforcement System, 1501 PEREGRINE, 2015, at 2 ("In the twenty-five years before 1996, just 3
percent of all people expelled from the United States were formally removed ... versus 97 percent
who were informally returned.").
28. See Alison Siskin & Ruth Ellen Wasem, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL33109, Immigration Policy
on Expedited Removal of Aliens 3 (2005).
29. Id.; see also Philip G. Schrag, A Well-Founded Fear: The Congressional Battle to Save
Political Asylum in America (2000); Mark Hetfield et al., U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom,
Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal Volume I: Findings & Recommendations 1-2
(2005).
30. See SISKEN & WASEM, supra note 28, at 2-3.
31. See id. at 1-2.
32. Id. at 2; see also id. at 4-6 (describing the basics of removal).
33. See MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43226, AN OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION MATTERS 5 (2013).
34. See id. at 2, 5. "An alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,
or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney
General, is inadmissible." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
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between exclusion and deportation with the concept of "admission." 35 Those
who have been lawfully admitted (i.e., with visas) generally retain formal
procedural protections.36 Others, however, may be treated like those denied
admission at a port of entry, i.e., summarily. Expedited removal thus has
clear constitutional implications. Where one stood at the time of arrest has
long been constitutionally significant (with some technical exceptions for
those at ports of entry). 37 Due process norms have protected those who had
"passed through our gates, even illegally." 38
Over time, the group subjected to expedited removal has expanded.39
The Trump Administration energetically sought to expand it still further. In
July 2019, DHS sought to apply expedited removal, 40 in its "sole and
unreviewable discretion" to noncitizens encountered anywhere in the United
States-even more than 100 air miles from the border-"who have been
continuously present for less than two years." 41 This was temporarily
enjoined.4 2 However, such an expansion may ultimately well be permitted.43
35. See generally David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New
Immigration Laws, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 673, 689 (2000).
36. Id. at 679-80.
37. See SISKEN & WASEM, supra note 28, at 2-3.
38. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
39. See, e.g., Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section
235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,924, 68,924 (Nov. 13,
2002) (expanding expedited removal to noncitizens caught within the United States who had arrived
by sea but who had not been physically and continuously present in the country for two years prior
to apprehension). In August 2004, expedited removal was further expanded to include noncitizens
encountered by an immigration officer within 100 air miles of the U.S. southwest land border, who
cannot establish "to the satisfaction of an immigration officer that they have been physically present
in the United States continuously for the preceding 14-day period." SISKEN & WASEM, supra note
28, at 2-3. In January 2006, it was further expanded along all U.S. borders and applied to "illegal
alien families" apprehended in areas along the nation's southern, northern, and coastal borders. Id.
at 6-7.
40. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg. 35,409, 35,409 (July 23, 2019);
Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec'y U.S. Dep't Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting
Comm'r U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al., 7 (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_SlImplementing-the-Presidents-
Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-ImprovementPolicies.pdf (directing DHS to issue "a
new Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal").
41. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, supra note 40, at 35,412-13.
42. See Make the Rd. N.Y. v. McAleenan, 405 F. Supp. 3d 1, 25 n.12 (D.D.C. 2019), rev'd
sub nom. Make the Rd. N.Y. v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
43. See, e.g., Make the Rd. N.Y., 962 F.3d at 618 ("[B]ecause Congress committed the
judgment whether to expand expedited removal to the Secretary's 'sole and unreviewable
discretion,' the Secretary's decision is not subject to review under the APA's standards for agency
decisionmaking. Nor is it subject to the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements."
(citation omitted)).
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This could subject many hundreds of thousands of people-and in some
sense all of us-to expedited removal.
Courts have noted risks and dangers of this system, while bemoaning
their self-assessed lack of capacity to do anything about it. As one Court of
Appeals noted in 2010, "To say that this procedure is fraught with risk of
arbitrary, mistaken, or discriminatory behavior ... is not, however, to say
that courts are free to disregard jurisdictional limitations." 44 I have elsewhere
explored whether expedited removal is inherently impossible to oversee
sufficiently to avoid predictable rights infringements? And whether "by its
very nature" it poses "a serious, perhaps unacceptable, risk of dangerous
accretions of government agency power?"45 This essay considers how the
Thuraissigiam decision not only fails to grapple with these concerns, but it
may also preclude meaningful consideration of them by any court. 46
DHS V THURAISSIGAM
The earliest justifications for summary or expedited removal were, as
noted, its efficacy as a border control regime, primarily as to those with
"frivolous" asylum claims. 47 Proponents also argued that it focuses on those
with low "stakes."48 Although the system has faced severe criticism virtually
from the moment it was first conceived, 49 most challenges to the system have
failed in court. However, the requirements of habeas corpus review and the
Suspension Clause were unresolved. 0
The Third Circuit considered claims brought by twenty-eight families,
who sought review of their expedited removal orders based on asylum
officers' "negative credible fear determinations."5' They asserted that if the
expedited removal statute were not construed to provide for habeas review
of such claims, the Suspension Clause would be violated. 52 The court held
44. Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2010).
45. Kanstroom, Expedited Removal and Due Process, supra note 22, at 1345.
46. Cf Stephen Manning & Kari Hong, Getting It Righted: Access to Counsel in Rapid
Removals, 101_MARQ. L. REV. 673, 679 (2018) (arguing that "providing meaningful access to
counsel throughout the expedited removal regime at each of the critical fact-finding and
adjudication moments improves accuracy without substantially impacting speed.").
47. See SISKEN & WASEM, supra note 28, at 3, 16 ("Proponents ... contend that aliens use
frivolous appeals to postpone deportation."); Martin, supra note 35, at 675 ("[T]o lay the
groundwork for more severe sanctions if they do not take the law enforcement hint.").
48. See Martin, supra note 35, at 701 (relating the location of entry to the low stakes of
removal).
49. See Kanstroom, Expedited Removal and Due Process, supra note 22, at 1346 n.124.
50. See id. at 1352.
51. Castro v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 2016).
52. Id. at 444.
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that because petitioners were "seeking initial admission to the United States,"
they had no right to habeas review under the Suspension Clause even though
they had physically entered the United States before being arrested.53 Thus,
the court relied upon the statutory designation of noncitizens as "seeking
admission," not their actual presence on U.S. soil.5 4 Petitioners "failed" at
the first step of the court's analysis "because the Supreme Court has
unequivocally concluded that 'an alien seeking initial admission to the
United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding
his application.""' The Third Circuit panel also thought it important that
"[p]etitioners were each apprehended within hours of surreptitiously entering
the United States."5 6 The panel opined that, "we think it appropriate to treat
them as 'alien[s] seeking initial admission to the United States.' 57 This was
obviously a rather abrupt and summary resolution of a major doctrinal
dilemma. Such reasoning would imply that, for noncitizens, "much of the
United States is now a Constitution-free zone."5 8
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Castro.59 But another case
involved Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Tamil asylum-seeker who had fled
Sri Lanka and claimed that he had been abducted and tortured. He was
apprehended shortly after crossing the U.S. border and was given an
expedited removal order "after the government determined that he did not
have a credible fear of persecution."60 How had the government decided
this? He had been referred for a "credible fear interview," but an asylum
officer, after a brief interview, determined that he had not established a
"credible fear of persecution."6 ' A supervisor approved, and an immigration
judge affirmed the finding in a quick, "check-box" decision. 62
Thuraissigiam, in short, never had a hearing.
He challenged this action through a habeas corpus petition. In a
remarkably chilling passage, the district court judge accepted his claims as
true:
In 2014, [Thumissigiam] was approached by men on his farm who
identified themselves as government intelligence officers and called [him]
53. Id. at 445-46.
54. See id. at 424-25.
55. Id. at 445.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Kanstroom, Expedited Removal and Due Process, supra note 22, at 1353.
59. 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017).
60. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 287 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1078-79 (S.D. Cal.
2018), rev 'd, 917 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2019), rev 'd, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
61. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1968.
62. Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1101.
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by his name. [He] was then pushed into a van where he was bound, beaten,
and interrogated about his political activities . . .. [Thuraissigiam] then
endured additional torture before he woke up in a hospital where he spent
several days recovering .... [He] went into hiding in Sri Lanka and India,
and then in 2016 he fled the country. 63
The court concluded, however, that even with such facts, "strict
restraints on [the court's] jurisdictional reach to review expedited removal
orders does not violate the Suspension Clause." 64 Thuraissigiam's habeas
petition was thus dismissed and his motion for an emergency stay of removal
was denied.65
On appeal, Thuraissigiam's essential argument was that "noncitizens
have always been able to test the legality of their removal through habeas." 66
If the district court were to be affirmed, he argued, it would be the first time
that either the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court "permitted a noncitizen
who entered the country to be removed without judicial scrutiny of the
legality of the removal." 67
The Ninth Circuit agreed.68 However, in a remarkable 7-2 decision, the
Supreme Court has now held that Thuraissigiam has no constitutional right
to habeas corpus review. 69 The majority opinion by Justice Alito, joined by
four others, held that the statutory limitations on habeas review do not violate
the Suspension Clause.70 As importantly, and seemingly gratuitously, Alito
opined that the case presents no problem under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.71
Essentially, Alito concluded that because Thuraissigiam had requested
more than mere release from detention (the "historical core of the habeas
writ") and because he was a noncitizen seeking "initial admission," he had
no Constitutional due process rights beyond what might be granted by
statute.72 Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
63. Thuraissigiam, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 1078.
64. Id. at 1082.
65. Id. at 1083-84 (declaring final orders).
66. Opening Brief of Appellant at 17, Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d
1097 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-55313).
67. Id.
68. See Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1119 ("Therefore, we hold that § 1252(e)(2) violates the
Suspension Clause as applied to Thuraissigiam, although we do not profess to decide in this opinion
what right or rights Thuraissigiam may vindicate via use of the writ.").
69. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1964 (2020).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 1964.
72. Id. at 1963-64, 2009.
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concurred on narrower grounds.73 Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice
Elena Kagan, strongly dissented.74
Alito viewed Thuraissigiam's petition as a claim for "the right to enter
or remain in a country or to obtain administrative review potentially leading
to that result." 75 He also concluded that the writ of habeas corpus had to be
construed as it existed in 1789. On this view, it does not and "has never
encompassed respondent's claims" because writ was used only to secure
release from detention. 76 Thus, habeas could not include Thuraissigiam's
claims to vacate his expedited removal order and to be permitted to apply for
asylum with more procedural protections. There are more things wrong with
the majority's reasoning than can be fully explored in a brief essay. But it
clearly seems to contradict the fairly recent precedents of INS v. St. Cyr and
Boumediene v. Bush.??
St. Cyr had also involved a habeas petition, filed by a lawful permanent
resident, who faced deportation after pleading guilty to a criminal charge. 78
At the time of his criminal conduct and of his plea, he would have been
eligible for a discretionary "Section 212(c)" waiver of deportation.79 His
removal proceedings, however, began after the statutory repeal of Section
212(c), retroactively. 80 The Attorney General thus asserted that St. Cyr was
no longer eligible to apply for a waiver and, in effect, had no defense to
deportation.8i
The Supreme Court ruled, first, that statutes had not eliminated
jurisdiction to review St. Cyr's habeas petition. 82 The Suspension Clause
meant that "some 'judicial intervention in deportation cases' is
unquestionably 'required by the Constitution."' 8 3 As I noted in 2002, the
73. See id. at 1988 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I agree that enforcing [statutory review] limits in
this particular case does not violate the Suspension Clause's constitutional command.").
74. See id. at 1993 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1969 (majority opinion). The conflation of "enter" and "remain" is striking, as these
claims have historically been treated quite distinctly. See id. at 1969.
76. Id. at 1963 n.12. Justice Clarence Thomas, also concurring, wrote that the "founding
generation viewed the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as a freedom from arbitrary detention."
Id. at 1985.
77. See 533 U.S. 289 (2001); 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
78. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 292-93; see also Daniel Kanstroom, St. Cyr or Insincere: The Strange
Quality ofSupreme Court Victory,16 GEO. IMMiGR. L.J. 413 (2002) [hereinafter Kanstroom, St. Cyr
or Insincere].
79. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293.
80. Id. at 293.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 314.
83. Id. at 300 (quoting Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953)).
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implications of the St. Cyr decision were profoundly important.84 The Court
had affirmed, first, that "habeas corpus remains available to challenge
executive detention of citizens and aliens alike;" and second, that "complete
preclusion of judicial review of questions of law relating to non-citizens
facing deportation would present, at the very least, a 'serious constitutional
question."'85
However, I was quite concerned at the time, and I am even more
concerned now that the St. Cyr Court had not articulated a clear constitutional
holding.86 Rather, the Court, following the precedent it set in Calcano-
Martinez v. INS, relied upon constitutional avoidance interpretation: that
constitutional "concerns can best be alleviated by construing the jurisdiction-
stripping provisions of that statute not to preclude aliens such as petitioners
from pursuing habeas relief pursuant to @ 2241."87
In Thuraissigiam, Justice Alito held that St. Cyr "does nothing" because
it merely reaffirmed conclusions drawn from 1789-era habeas cases: that the
writ "provided a vehicle to challenge all manner of detention by government
officials" and that "the writ could be invoked by aliens already in the country
who were held in custody pending deportation.""" This is a parsimonious
and patently incorrect reading of St. Cyr. As Justice Sotomayor correctly
noted, both St. Cyr and Boumediene indicate that perfect consistency with
pre-1789 cases is neither possible nor required. 89 The St. Cyr court had
"simply asked, at a far more general level, whether habeas jurisdiction was
historically 'invoked on behalf of noncitizens . . . in the immigration context'
to 'challenge Executive . . . detention in civil cases."' 90 Indeed, the
Boumediene Court had noted that a "'[d]iligent search by all parties
reveal[ed] no certain conclusions' about the relevant scope of the common-
law writ in 1789."91
Alito's narrow interpretation of Somerset v. Stewart 2 is also noteworthy.
As Lord Mansfield had issued a habeas writ that prevented the removal of a
slave to Jamaica, 93 the analogy to Thuraissigiam is clear. Alito, however,
84. See Kanstroom, St. Cyr or Insincere, supra note 78.
85. Id. at 413.
86. See id.
87. 533 U.S. 348, 351 (2001).
88. 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1981 (2020).
89. Id. at 1998-99 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1998 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 302, 305 (2001)).
91. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008)).
Justice Alito cavalierly dismissed the relevancy of Boumediene because it "[wa]s not about
immigration at all." Id. at 1981 (majority opinion).
92. (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.).
93. Id. at 510.
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argued that the petitioner had been allowed to stay in England not "due not
to the [habeas] writ issued . .. but to English law regarding entitlement to
reside in the country," which differed significantly from contemporary
immigration statutes. 94 To say the least, this casual reading overlooks the
broad implications of Lord Mansfield's decision in light of prior rulings and
powerful politico-legal controversies of the time.95 Without being too
"presentist" about it, we ought to consider that Alito is essentially holding
that had positive English law not permitted the slave to stay, then it would
have been appropriate, indeed perhaps required, for Lord Mansfield to
acquiesce in a forced return to brutal slavery. Whatever one might say about
an eighteenth-century analysis of that type, surely it is not acceptable in a
constitutional system with basic due process and other human rights
protections.
It is true, however, that, unlike Thuraissigiam, St. Cyr had entered and
established lawful permanent residence in the United States.96 As we have
seen per Yamataya,97 this could make a significant difference for due process
purposes. The government argued its merits brief that Thuraissigiam was
properly classified as "an alien seeking initial admission" because he was a
clandestine entrant with no real ties to the United States and was quickly
apprehended twenty-five yards from the U.S.-Mexico border.98 In what may
turn out to be an especially portentous and pernicious aspect of the majority
opinion, Justice Alito wrote that individuals-even on U.S. soil-who seek
initial admission to the United States do not have due process rights beyond
what the statute confers. 99 This seems to ignore numerous precedents and
much dicta.
Alito also analogized Thuraissigiam's claim to that rejected by the Court
in 2008 inMunafv. Geren.0 0 That case involved two American citizens who
were accused of committing crimes in Iraq.10 1 They had filed habeas
petitions to block their transfer from U.S. custody to the custody of the
Central Criminal Court of Iraq.10 2 The court denied habeas relief because,
according to Alito, the Munaf petitioners had essentially wanted the United
94. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1973.
95. See CHRISTER PETLEY, WHITE FURY: A JAMAICAN SLAVEHOLDER AND THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION 150 (2018).
96. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 293 (2001).
97. See 189 U.S. 86, 98 (1903).
98. Brief for the United States at 17, Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct.
1959 (2020) (No. 19-161), 2019 WL 6727092, at *17.
99. See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1980-81.
100. 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
101. Id. at 681, 683.
102. Id. at 682.
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States to protect them from criminal prosecution in Iraq.1 03 However, as
Justice Souter had noted in concurrence in Munaf(joined by Justices Breyer
and Ginsburg, both of whom also concurred in Thuraissigiam 104), the Munaf
Court had reserved judgment on an "extreme case in which the Executive has
determined that a detainee [in US custody] is likely to be tortured but decides
to transfer him anyway." 0 5 Souter added that he "would extend the caveat
to a case in which the probability of torture is well documented, even if the
Executive fails to acknowledge it."1 06 Moreover, Souter noted (correctly in
my view) that, "if the political branches did favor transfer it would be in order
to ask whether substantive due process bars the Government from consigning
its own people to torture." 0 7 As the Court had long held, "where federally
protected rights [are threatened], it has been the rule from the beginning that
courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief."108
The Thuraissigiam dissenters-Sotomayor and Kagan-strenuously
disagreed with Alito's view of the relief sought by Thuraissigiam's habeas
petition.1 09 Justice Sotomayor highlighted how, "[a]t bottom, respondent
alleged that he was unlawfully denied admission under governing asylum
statutes and regulations."" 0  She noted that Thuraissigiam did, in fact, ask
"to be freed from wrongful executive custody."1" He had already spent two
years in immigration detention and would be detained again were his
expedited removal order to be executed."1 2 The fact that such release might
also require admission into the United States or additional asylum procedures
did not mean it was outside the scope of the habeas writ's historical purpose.
Moreover, she argued that even the 1789-era cases show that the habeas writ
had long included claims such as those brought by Thuraissigiam. "13 The
writ "did not free [the] slave so much as it protected him from deportation."" 14
103. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1970-71.
104. Id. at 1988 (Breyer, J., concurring).
105. Munaf, 533 U.S. at 706 (Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., concurring).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
109. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1994-95 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1994.
111. Id. at 1996.
112. Brief for Respondent at 30, Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959
(2020) (No. 19-161), 2020 WL 3534476, at *30.
113. See, e.g., Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 503 (K.B.).
114. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1999, 2003 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 175 (2010)) (arguing
that Aunafwas inapplicable because it had involved the rights of sovereign nations, interfering with
military operations, and the requested use of habeas to avoid extradition.)
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The majority and dissent differed on many other important interpretive
points that are beyond the scope of this essay, including the correct
understanding of cases from the so-called the "finality era" (from 1891 to
1952 when statutes generally precluded judicial review of immigration
enforcement) in which courts grappled with how to determine when review
was constitutionally required." 5 Most fundamental to this disagreement was
Ekiu, in which a Japanese woman was detained because an immigration
inspector found that she was likely to become a "public charge.""1 6 She filed
a habeas petition, arguing that if the statute had in fact granted exclusive,
unreviewable authority to the inspector to decide her right to enter then it
would be unconstitutional."7  The Ekiu Court held that the inspector's
decision was "final and conclusive," and that this was constitutional.'"
In Thuraissigiam, Alito highlighted that the Ekiu Court "did not hold
that the Suspension Clause imposed any limitations on the authority of
Congress to restrict the issuance of writs of habeas corpus in immigration
matters.""9 The dissenters, however, noted that Ekiu and other finality-era
decisions had construed the immigration statute to allow judicial review of
legal challenges.12 0 The reason was that review of legal questions was
"constitutionally compelled."' 2' Sotomayor thus wrote that Ekiu explicitly
stated that "[a]n alien immigrant . . . prevented from landing [in the United
States] by any [executive] officer . .. and thereby restrained of his liberty, is
doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint
is lawful."12 2 Sotomayor also cited the 1953 case of Heikkila v. Barber, in
which the Court had construed the then-operative 1917 statute as
"preclud[ing] judicial intervention in deportation cases except insofar as it
was required by the Constitution."123 Alito had viewed Heikkila as irrelevant
because it was not a habeas case.1 24 This, however, seems to ignore the
Court's recitation of the well-accepted idea that the Constitution must require
some 'judicial intervention,"' at least for extreme or egregious cases.1 25 If
habeas-as required by the Suspension Clause-is not the mechanism of last
115. Id. at 2004-06 (majority opinion).
116. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 662 (1892).
117. Id. at 661.
118. Id. at 663.
119. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1977.
120. Id. at 2005 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 660).
123. Id. at 2007-08 (emphasis added) (quoting Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 234-35
(1953)).
124. Id. at 1980 (majority opinion).
125. Id. at 1981 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001)).
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resort, then what would be? Alito wrote that the fundamental principle that
the political branches have plenary authority over the admission or exclusion
of immigrants "would be meaningless if it became inoperative as soon as an
arriving alien set foot on U. S. soil."'126 To this one might respond that
constitutional rights would be meaningless if the government may define
people by statute to be outside of the United States even when they are
physically present.
Alito analogized clandestine entries to ports of entry where noncitizens
generally cannot invoke due process rights.1 27 Thuraissigiam, he opined,
stood "on the threshold of initial entry."1 28 However, as Sotomayor noted,
the so-called "entry fiction" is rightly a limited one: even though an airport
is strictly speaking on United States soil, a port of entry is different from
being unrestricted on U.S. soil.1 29 Thuraissigiam was past any port of entry
and "was actually within the territorial limits of the United States."1 30 He
thus had due process rights as must we all while on U.S. soil. Where Alito's
logic would stop is "hard to say.,"131 If "[t]aken to its extreme . . . [it] would
permit Congress to constitutionally eliminate all procedural protections for
any noncitizen the Government deems unlawfully admitted and summarily
deport them."1 32
This is hardly a trivial concern. Indeed, one is not heartened by Justice
Alito's rather callous and snarky observation that although "respondent does
not claim an entitlement to release, the Government is happy to release him-
provided the release occurs in the cabin of a plane bound for Sri Lanka."133
If read broadly, Thuraissigiam, then, could leave noncitizens in expedited
removal to the tender mercies of government agents who, we have seen time
and again, routinely ignore statutory and regulatory requirements.134
When seen in this light, the concurrence of Justices Breyer and Ginsburg
appears as a valiant, if perhaps tragic, attempt to limit the implications of
Alito's reasoning.1 35 Breyer unfortunately agreed that the Suspension Clause
126. Id. at 1982.
127. See id. at 1982-83.
128. Id. at 1963-64. But see Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213
(1953) in which the Supreme Court permitted the use of a habeas writ to challenge exclusion.
129. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 2012 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2013.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1970 (majority opinion); see also Ex parte D'Olivera, 7 F. Cas. 853, 854 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1813) (No. 3,967) (releasing sailor to a ship).
134. See Kanstroom, Expedited Removal and Due Process, supra note 22, at 1341.
135. One is reminded of the constitutional avoidance reasoning of Breyer's majority opinion in
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696-97 (2001).
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was not implicated as to Thuraissigiam, noting "that the constitutional floor
set by the Suspension Clause here cannot be high."136 The availability of
habeas relief, he continued, "need not be as extensive" as it might be for
people with stays of longer duration in the United States.1 37 He wondered,
"What review might the Suspension Clause assure, say, a person
apprehended years after she crossed our borders clandestinely and started a
life in this country?"1 38 As we have seen, this is not inconsistent with Justice
Harlan's caveat in Yamataya,139 though it does seem contradicted by later
precedents that relied more on presence itself than on ties. 140 Also, it is not
entirely clear how Breyer means to distinguish the basic availability of
habeas review from its "scope.,"141 His major point, though, is that habeas
corpus is an "adaptable remedy," and the "precise application and scope" of
the review it guarantees may change "depending upon the circumstances."1 4 2
This is a position-about the nature of due process in various settings-that
many have advocated over the years.
It is more difficult to understand Breyer's assertion that "Congress may,
consistent with the Suspension Clause, make unreviewable" Thuraissigiam's
claims because they are essentially questions of "fact" rather than questions
of law or the application of law to fact.1 4 3 As Sotomayor correctly notes, this
is an odd position in that even such conclusions of fact "should not have
foreclose[d]" Thuraissigiam's "ability to bring them [before a court] in the
first place."14 4 Breyer's model raises the question of who determines whether
a claim is one of fact or law and at what stage in proceedings does that take
place?
In sum, the potential implications of Thuraissigiam are extremely
significant: for millions of noncitizens among us and for our understanding
of the essential protections of habeas corpus and judicial review against
arbitrary or discriminatory government action. Ultimately, we are now left
to wonder how noncitizens can "ensure the integrity of an expedited removal
order ... [that] is not subject to any meaningful judicial oversight as to its
136. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1990 (Breyer J., concurring).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1989.
139. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903).
140. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 3456 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); Mathews
v. Diaz, 4265 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); see also Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 2012 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Court has since determined that presence in the country is the touchstone for at
least some level of due process protections.").
141. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1989 (Breyer J., concurring).
142. Id. at 1989 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 779 (2008)).
143. Id. at 1990 (Breyer J., Concurring).
144. Id. at 1996 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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substance." 45 The line between those with rights and the rightless seems to
be moving ever further inward and ever further towards those with even
longer stays than Thuraissigiam had in the United States.' 46 This is a
dangerous, worrisome trend.1 4 7 As Henry M. Hart noted many years ago,
"courts [have] a responsibility to see that statutory authority was not
transgressed, that a reasonable procedure was used ... [and] that human
beings were not unreasonably subjected, even by direction of Congress, to an
uncontrolled official discretion."1 48  We must remain attentive to how
expedited removal will inevitably cause serious errors and dangerous
deprivations of rights.1 49 Especially in light of its Trumpian expansion, it
invites-indeed it tends to incentivize-transgressions of statutory authority
and uncontrolled discretion by government agents. Such shortcuts by law
enforcement have a dangerous metastatic tendency. As Justice Sotomayor
noted in a related context, this is "lawlessness . . .basically saying that we're
not a country of law, that we're a country of arbitrariness." 5 0 Even Justice
Stephen J. Field, author of the infamous Chinese Exclusion Case, once wrote
that "[t]he contention that persons within the territorial jurisdiction of this
republic might be beyond the protection of the law was heard with pain." 5 '
145. Id. at 1993.
146. See, e.g., Make the Rd. N.Y. v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
147. One should note, however, a rather puzzling and oblique footnote to the majority opinion
that might seem to offer hope against the worst imaginable abuses:
Whatever may be said about the concurrence's hypotheticals, it is possible to imagine all
sorts of abuses not even remotely related to unauthorized executive detention that could
be imposed on people in this country if the Constitution allowed Congress to deprive the
courts of any jurisdiction to entertain claims regarding such abuses. If that were to
happen, it would no doubt be argued that constitutional provisions other than the
Suspension Clause guaranteed judicial review. We have no occasion to consider such
arguments here.
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1975 n.21.
148. The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1390 (1953) (emphasis added).
149. See Kanstroom, ExpeditedRemoval and Due Process, supra note 22 at 1341; see also Peter
Margulies, The Boundaries Of Habeas: Due Process, The Suspension Clause, And Judicial Review
Of Expedited Removal Under The Immigration And Nationality Act, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 405, 409
(2020) (arguing before the Court's Thuraissigiam decision in favor of "review that ensures
independence, absence of arbitrary decision-making, and fundamental fairness, but is more
deferential than the error-correction approach.").
150. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-
1204), 2017 WL 4517127, at *8.
151. Wong v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 242-43 (1896).
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